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THE MYSTERIES OF FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AFTER
CARTESIO
CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE* ANDMICHAEL SCHILLIG**
Abstract The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Cartesio was
eagerly awaited as a clariﬁcation of the questions concerning the scope of
the right of establishment (articles 49, 54 Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU), (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) that remained after
previous landmark decisions such as Centros, U¨berseering, and Inspire Art.
This article analyses the implications of Cartesio in light of different
scenarios of transfer of the registered and the real seat within the European
Union. It assesses the interrelations of right of establishment and private
international law rules for the determination of the law applicable to
companies and concludes that the case law of the European Court of Justice
after Cartesio, rather than providing for a coherent system of European
company law, leads to arbitrary distinctions and signiﬁcantly impedes the
free movement of companies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, no one single issue seems to have occupied the minds of
European company lawyers more than the question as to what extent com-
panies formed under the law of a Member State may be able to enjoy the right
to freedom of establishment. Three judgments handed down by the European
Court of Justice at the turn of the millennium—Centros,1 U¨berseering2 and
Inspire Art3—triggered an unprecedented amount of scholarly attention across
Europe.4 Despite this intensive academic debate and a number of follow-up
* Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics and Political Science.
** Lecturer in International Commercial and Financial Law, School of Law, King’s College
London. The authors are indebted to Peter Cserne, assistant professor at Pa´zma´ny Pe´ter Catholic
University Faculty of Law, for clarifying Hungarian law and facilitating our analysis.
1 Case C-127/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR, I-1459.
2 Case C-208/00 U¨berseering BV v Nordic Construction Baumanagement GmbH [NCC]
[2002] ECR I-9919.
3 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003]
ECR I-10155.
4 eg H Halbhuber, ‘National Doctrinal Structures and European Company Law’ (2001) 38
CML Rev 1385; J Bisacre, ‘The Migration of Companies within the European Union and the
Proposed Fourteenth Company Law Directive’ (2001) 3 ICCLJ 251; M Andenas, ‘Free
Movement of Companies’ (2003) 119 LQR 221; E Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s
Seat in European Company Law’ (2003) 40 CMLR 661; F Wooldridge, ‘U¨berseering: Freedom of
Establishment of Companies Afﬁrmed’ (2003) 14 EBLR 227; S Lombardo, ‘Conﬂict of Law
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judgments, the ambit of the right to freedom of establishment for companies
remained fairly uncertain, not least because often in the Court’s decisions
sweeping general pronouncements were supplemented by subtle distinctions.
It is therefore no wonder that the Court’s judgment in Cartesio5 was eagerly
awaited as the latest piece of the puzzle. However, those who expected clari-
ﬁcation will be bitterly disappointed. Instead of consolidating the right to
freedom of establishment, the Court, in a judgment that in its English version
is at times barely comprehensible, introduces new subtleties and complexities
which will render freedom of establishment for companies a rather ineffective
tool for the establishment of the Internal Market.
This article analyses the implications of Cartesio in light of different sce-
narios of transfer of the registered and the real seat within the European
Union. It assesses the interrelations of right of establishment and private
international law rules for the determination of the law applicable to com-
panies and concludes that the case law of the European Court of Justice after
Cartesio, rather than providing for a coherent system of European company
law, leads to arbitrary distinctions and signiﬁcantly impedes the free move-
ment of companies.
II. FROM DAILY MAIL TO SEVIC
Where a company6 that was validly formed in a Member State (A) where
it has its registered ofﬁce is, according to the law of a second Member
State (B), treated as having transferred to Member State (B) its central
administration or principal place of business, the rules that Member State (B)
imposes on and applies to the company will be subject to the right to freedom
of establishment.7 Freedom of establishment can also be invoked by ‘a com-
pany that was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of estab-
lishing itself in a second Member State where its main or indeed entire
business is to be conducted.’8 This is deﬁnitely the case where the com-
pany’s business in the second Member State is conducted via a registered
Rules in Company Law after U¨berseering: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the
Allocation of Policy Competence in the European Union’ (2003) 4 EBOR 301; P Oliver and
W-H Roth, ‘The Internal Market and the four Freedoms’ (2004) 41 CMLR 407; A Looijestijn-
Clearie, ‘Have the Dikes Collapsed? Inspire Art a Further Break-through in the Freedom of
Establishment of Companies?’ (2004) 5 EBOR 389; F Jacobs, ‘The Evolution of the European
Legal Order’ (2004) 41 CMLR 303; G-J Vossestein, ‘Exit Restrictions on Freedom of Estab-
lishment after Marks & Spencer’ (2006) 7 EBOR 863; F Mucciarelli, ‘Company ‘Emigration’ and
EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited’ (2008) 9 EBOR 267.
5 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato´ Szola´ltato´ bt [2008] ECR I-9641.
6 cf art 54(2) TFEU (ex-art 48(2) EC): the wording of this provision is misleading (‘and other
legal persons’); it covers entities that enjoy separate legal personality as well as civil or com-
mercial partnerships that under the applicable law are not afforded separate legal personality.
7 U¨berseering (n 2) para 52.
8 Inspire Art (n 3) para 95; referring to Centros (n 1) para 17, and Case 79/85 Segers [1986]
ECR 2375 para 16.
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branch9 (in a strictly formal sense).10 However, given the decision in
U¨berseering and the inclusive language used in Inspire Art,11 freedom of
establishment also seems to apply where the company’s establishment in the
Member State of destination is the company’s only establishment.
Registration of a branch in the Member State of destination, therefore, does
not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for enjoying the protection of freedom
of establishment. Finally, cross-border merger operations have been held to
‘constitute particular methods of exercise of the freedom of establishment,
important for the proper functioning of the internal market’.12 Thus, Member
States are prevented from treating a merger between companies differently
depending on the internal or cross-border nature of the merger.13
What remained unresolved until now was the question of whether pro-
visions of the Member State of incorporation which rendered the departure of
a company impossible or more burdensome were also subject to freedom of
establishment scrutiny. In Daily Mail14 the Court held that ‘in the present state
of Community law’, articles 49, 54 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) ‘cannot be interpreted as conferring on
companies incorporated under the law of a Member State a right to transfer
their central management and control and their central administration to
another Member State while retaining their status as companies incorporated
under the legislation of the ﬁrst Member State.’ After U¨berseering15 and
Inspire Art,16 this statement could claim validity only in respect of the ‘rela-
tions between a company and the Member State under the laws of which it had
been incorporated’ and whose laws restricted the company’s mobility. For this
particular situation, neither in U¨berseering nor in Inspire Art did the Court in
any way depart from Daily Mail. Rather, the Court seemed to differentiate
between the question of applicability of freedom of establishment, on the one
hand, and the preliminary question of whether the company was validly
formed, and remained in existence, under the law of a Member State, on the
other. This is because ‘unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the
law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law.
They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines
their incorporation and functioning.’17
9 Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure
requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company
governed by the law of another State [1989] OJ L 395/36.
10 Centros (n 1) para 17; Inspire Art (n 3) para 97.
11 Inspire Art (n 3) para 95–96.
12 Case C-411/03 SEVIC Systems AG [2005] ECR I-10805 para 19.
13 SEVIC (n 12) para 31.
14 Case 81/87 The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte
Daily Mail and General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483 para 24.
15 U¨berseering (n 2) para 61–73. 16 Inspire Art (n 3) 103.
17 Daily Mail (n 14) para 19.
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Doubts were raised in Lasteyrie du Sallaint where the ECJ held that arti-
cle 49 TFEU (ex-article 43 EC) ‘also prohibits the Member State of origin
from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its own
nationals’ and consequently precludes a Member State from establishing,
in order to prevent a risk of tax avoidance, a mechanism for taxing as yet
unrealized increases in value, where a taxpayer transfers his tax residence
outside that State.18 However, the case did not represent a clear departure from
Daily Mail because it dealt with a natural person whose legal and natural
existence clearly does not depend on the legal order of its home Member State.
In Marks & Spencer the Court went one step further and held that the
provisions concerning freedom of establishment also ‘prohibit the Member
State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member
State . . . of a company incorporated under its legislation.’19 A national rule
which allows a parent company to set-off losses incurred by resident sub-
sidiaries, but not the losses incurred by subsidiaries incorporated in another
Member State, was found to constitute a restriction20 to freedom of estab-
lishment by deterring the parent company ‘from setting up subsidiaries in
other Member States.’21 Again, the Daily Mail reasoning remained unscathed
because the setting up by a company incorporated in one Member State of a
subsidiary in another Member State (secondary establishment) does not affect
the parent company’s existence as a ‘creature of the law’ of the Member State
of incorporation.
As for the cross border merger context, the Court’s decision in SEVIC
seemed to suggest that the different treatment of a merger that involves a
foreign company as compared to a purely domestic merger always amounts to
a restriction of the right of establishment irrespective of whether the different
treatment emanates from the Member State of the absorbing entity or the
Member State of the absorbed entity.22 This appeared to signal a signiﬁcant
departure from Daily Mail, at least as far as discriminatory measures were
concerned. However, the fact remains that in SEVIC registration was refused
by the Member State of the absorbing entity and, therefore, arguably by the
country of destination.
18 Case C-9/02 Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409 para 42.
19 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v HM’s Inspector of Taxes [2005] ECR I-10837
para 31.
20 The Court held that the restriction was justiﬁed to the extent that the losses incurred by the
non-resident subsidiary could be taken into account in the subsidiary’s State of residence.
21 Marks & Spencer (n 19) para 33.
22 SEVIC (n 12) para 31: ‘Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude registration in the national
commercial register of the merger by dissolution without liquidation of one company and transfer
of the whole of its assets to another company from being refused in general in a Member State
where one of the two companies is established in another Member State, whereas such registration
is possible, . . . , where the two companies participating in the merger are both established in the
territory of the ﬁrst Member State.’
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In light of these uncertainties and in order ‘to improve the efﬁciency and
competitive position of European companies by providing them with the
possibility of transferring their registered ofﬁce more easily’ so that they
can ‘choose a legal environment that best suits their business needs’ the
Commission contemplated a directive on the cross border transfer of a com-
pany’s registered ofﬁce.23 However, following a consultation process, the
Commission’s impact assessment concluded that it was not clear whether
adopting a directive would represent the least onerous way of achieving the
objectives pursued. The Commission argued that the practical impact of
the existing legislation on cross-border mobility24 was not yet known and the
issue of the transfer of the ‘registered ofﬁce’ might be clariﬁed by the Court in
Cartesio.25 Following the impact assessment, Commissioner McCreevy de-
cided there was no need for action at EU level. DG Internal Market and
Services has therefore stopped work on legislation in this area.
III. CARTESIO
The Cartesio case was enveloped in the mist of confusion right from the start.
According to the English translation of the reference for a preliminary ruling,
the Hungarian court seemed to ask whether a company that wished to transfer
its ‘registered ofﬁce’ to another Member State could invoke the right to free-
dom of establishment. The German translation referred to the‘Sitz’ of the com-
pany, the French translation to the‘sie`ge social’. Under the Companies Act
2006, the ‘registered ofﬁce’ is relevant as the place where documents may be
served26 andwhere a companymay keep registers and certain documents for in-
spection.27 It does not have to be located where the company has its operational
headquarters or principal place of business. Conversely,‘Sitz’ in Germany28
23 The Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory
Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 2002, 20, urged the Commission to bring
forward a revised proposal for a Fourteenth Directive on the Transfer of the Registered Ofﬁce.
In its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on modernising company law
and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union—A plan to move forward,
COM(2003)284 ﬁnal, 20, the Commission expressed its intention to present a new proposal for a
Fourteenth Directive in the short term.
24 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on
cross-border mergers of limited liability companies [2005] OJ L310/1.
25 Commission Staff Working Document: Impact assessment on the Directive on the cross-
border transfer of registered ofﬁce, 12.12.2007, SEC(2007) 1707, 5–6.
26 Companies Act 2006, s 1139(1).
27 Companies Act 2006, s 1136. Alternatively, the records may be kept at some other place
permitted by regulations to be made under Companies Act 2006, s 1136.
28 GmbHG, · 4a(2); AktG, · 5(2), as in force until 30 October 2008. In light of the right to
freedom of establishment and in order to create a level playing ﬁeld for domestic companies,
Germany has already changed its law in this respect. Since 1 November 2008, German private and
public companies may choose their operational headquarters freely within the Community. Only
the registered ofﬁce as stipulated in the articles of association must be situated in Germany.
cf Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des
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and ‘sie`ge social’ in France29 traditionally have to coincide with the place
from where the company is actually being run. The English translation of the
reference seems to have inﬂuenced the Commission’s impact assessment
where it was assumed that Cartesio was about the transfer of the ‘registered
ofﬁce’.30 It also prompted the Irish government to request the re-opening of the
oral procedure31 after Advocate General Maduro had delivered his opinion
based on a transfer of the real seat. 32
However, from the Advocate General’s opinion the facts seem to be
reasonably clear: Cartesio was a limited partnership formed in accordance
with Hungarian law and registered in Hungary. When it submitted an appli-
cation to the commercial court to amend its registration in the local com-
mercial register so as to register an address in Italy as its new operational
headquarters, the court rejected the application on the ground that Hungarian
law did not permit companies to transfer their operational headquarters to
another Member State while retaining their legal status as a company gov-
erned by Hungarian law. In order to change its headquarters, Cartesio would
have to dissolve in Hungary ﬁrst and then re-incorporate under Italian law.
When Cartesio appealed against the decision of the commercial court, the
Court of Appeal referred a number of questions to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling. As far as the right to freedom of establishment is concerned, the
Hungarian court essentially asked whether articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles
43, 48 EC) are to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which pre-
vents a company from transferring its operational headquarters to another
Member State whilst retaining its status as a company governed by the law of
the Member State of incorporation.33
Based on the order for reference, the Advocate General assumes that
Hungarian law is grounded in the ‘real seat’ theory.34 Under Hungarian law,
the place of a company’s operational headquarters is supposed to coincide
with its place of incorporation. Thus, Hungarian company law prohibits the
‘export’ of a Hungarian legal person to the territory of another Member State.
This, according to Advocate General Maduro, is within the scope of the right
of establishment.35 The Advocate General’s ﬁrst argument is essentially
GmbH-Rechts und zur Beka¨mpfung von Missbra¨uchen (MoMiG), BR-Drucksache 354/07, 25
May 2007, 65, 65 and Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Beka¨mpfung von
Mißbra¨uchen (MoMiG), 23.10.2008, BGBl. 2008, I Nr. 48, 2026. Current Hungarian law con-
tains a similar rule in regard to movements within the European Union, art 7/B. of Law No V
of 2006 on Public Company Information, Court Registration Proceedings and Voluntary
Dissolution Proceedings (2006. e´vi V. to¨rve´ny a ce´gnyilva´nossa´gro´l, a bı´ro´sa´gi ce´gelja´ra´sro´l e´s a
ve´gelsza´mola´sro´l).
29 P Merle, Droit commercial: Socie´te commerciales (11th edn, Paris, Dalloz, 2007) para 83.
30 Commission Staff Working Document (n 25) 5.
31 Cartesio (n 5) para 41–53.
32 AG Maduro, opinion in Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato´ Szola´ltato´ bt [2008] ECR I-9641,
para 2–4. 33 Cartesio (n 5) para 99.
34 On the correctness of this assumption under Hungarian law, see further discussion (n 97).
35 AG Maduro (n 32) para 23.
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derived from the Court’s reasoning in SEVIC: ‘National rules that allow a
company to transfer its operational headquarters only within the national ter-
ritory clearly treat cross-border situations less favourably than purely national
situations. In effect, such rules amount to a discrimination against the exercise
of freedom of movement.’36 In a second step, the Advocate General rejects the
Daily Mail reasoning37 and refutes efforts which try to distinguish Daily Mail
from Centros, U¨berseering and Inspire Art on the facts.38 Given that the right
to freedom of establishment ‘also prohibits the Member State of origin from
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its own
nationals,’39 distinctions based on aspects of primary as opposed to secondary
establishment and inbound versus outbound establishment were, according to
the Advocate General, never entirely persuasive.40 Under the general ana-
lytical framework, the Court would not ‘a priori’ exclude particular areas of
national law from the scope of the right of establishment.41 Although Member
States were free to organize their national company laws along the lines of real
seat theory or incorporation theory, freedom of establishment required a
minimum degree of mutual recognition and coordination of these various
systems of rules so that neither theory could be applied to its fullest extent.42
Consequently, it was
impossible, [. . .], to argue on the basis of the current state of Community law that
Member States enjoy an absolute freedom to determine the ‘life and death’ of
companies constituted under their domestic law, irrespective of the conse-
quences for the freedom of establishment. Otherwise, Member States would
have carte blanche to impose a ‘death sentence’ on a company constituted under
its laws just because it had decided to exercise the freedom of establishment.43
Because of the costs and administrative burdens inherent in ﬁrst having to
wind up the company in its country of origin and then to re-establish it com-
pletely in the country of destination, national rules that prevent an intra-EU
transfer of the operational headquarters amounted to a restriction on freedom
of establishment.44 This restriction may be justiﬁed on grounds of general
public interest. However, since the Hungarian rules ‘completely deny’ a
Hungarian company to transfer its operational headquarters to another
Member State it was, according to the Advocate General, ‘difﬁcult to see
how such “an outright negation of the freedom of establishment” could be
necessary for reasons of public interest.’45
The Court did not follow the path recommended by Advocate General
Maduro. In fact, it is not entirely clear whether the Court followed any path at
all. The Court’s starting point is its reasoning in Daily Mail: ‘[C]ompanies are
36 ibid para 25. 37 ibid para 26. 38 ibid para 28.
39 Case C-251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I-2787, para 28; Case C-9/02 Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004]
ECR I-2409, para 42, to which AG Maduro (n 32) refers in note 48 of his opinion.
40 AG Maduro (n 32) para 28. 41 ibid para 30. 42 ibid para 30.
43 ibid para 31. 44 ibid para 32. 45 AG Maduro (n 32) para 34.
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creatures of national law and exist only by virtue of the national legislation
which determines [their] incorporation and functioning.’46 Article 54 TFEU
(ex-article 48 EC) takes into account that national laws vary widely as to the
connecting factor required for incorporation and the subsequent modiﬁcation
of that factor.47 From this, the Court inferred in U¨berseering that a Member
State could restrict a company’s right to retain its legal personality under its
law when its centre of administration was transferred to a foreign country.48
Moreover, it considered article 54 TFEU (ex-article 48 EC) to leave the
question of the connecting factor and its subsequent change as unresolved by
the rules on freedom of establishment, and to reserve these issues for further
legislation.49 Consequently, ‘in the absence of a uniform Community law
deﬁnition of the companies which may enjoy the right of establishment on the
basis of a single connecting factor determining the national law applicable to a
company’, the question whether a company actually has the right to freedom
of establishment is ‘a preliminary matter which, as Community law now
stands, can only be resolved by the applicable national law.’50
Thus, a Member State has the power, ﬁrst, to deﬁne the connecting factor
required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of
that Member State. In this respect, freedom of establishment does not apply.51
This seems to follow logically from the Court’s premise quoted above.
Companies validly ‘formed in accordance with the law of a Member State’ are
to be awarded equal status with natural persons and can rely on freedom of
establishment. From the point of view of the company, the deﬁnition of the
connecting factor (that determines the applicable law) is a matter for national
law and immune from freedom of establishment interference in the same way
as are domestic substantive and procedural rules on company formation. This
conceptually clear picture becomes somewhat blurred, however, if one looks
at it from the perspective of the company’s founders. Their right to freedom of
establishment includes the right ‘to set up . . . companies.’52 Article 49 TFEU
(ex-article 43 EC) confers this right only under the conditions laid down by the
host Member State for its own nationals. However, in line with the Court’s
case law on the market freedoms in general,53 the ECJ has extended the scope
of freedom of establishment so as to encompass national measures which are
‘liable to hinder or make less attractive’ the exercise of freedom of estab-
lishment.54 If the founders could invoke this freedom in order to challenge
46 Cartesio (n 5) para 104. 47 ibid para 105–106. 48 ibid para 107.
49 ibid para 108. 50 ibid para 109. 51 ibid para 110.
52 cf art 49 TFEU (ex-art 43 EC); W Scho¨n, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit als Grundungsfreiheit’ in
P Hommelhoff, P Rawert and K Schmidt (eds), Festschrift fu¨r Hans-Joachim Priester zum 70.
Geburtstag (Dr Otto Schmidt, Ko¨ln, 2007) 737, 739–743.
53 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 873 (free movement of goods); Case C-76/90 Sa¨ger
[1991] ECR I-4221 (freedom to provide services); Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921
(free movement of workers); art 63 TFEU (ex-art 56 EC) explicitly refers to ‘restrictions on the
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries’.
54 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37.
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the connecting factor for incorporation required by a Member State, they
could equally challenge the substantive rules on company formation. Freedom
of establishment does not differentiate between substantive law and conﬂict of
laws rules. This would mean the end of national company law as we know it.
The content of large areas of substantive company law would have to be
deduced directly from freedom of establishment. Therefore, in accordance
with the rationale in Keck,55 conﬂict of laws and substantive company law
rules that ‘apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory’
and ‘affect in the same manner, in law and in fact’ domestic entrepreneurs
and those from other Member States should be deemed to fall outside the
scope of freedom of establishment. Such provisions do not speciﬁcally
impede market access by foreign incorporators more than they impede
company formation by domestic ones.56 Thus, so long as applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, substantive company law seems to be safe. As regards
the requirement of having the operational head ofﬁce in the Member State of
incorporation, it could be argued that it will be more difﬁcult for foreign
founders to establish a physical presence in the Member State of incorpor-
ation, thus treating them differently at least in fact. Such a requirement may,
therefore, only stand if justiﬁed by imperative requirements in the public
interest.57
Secondly, according to the Court, the Member State also has the power to
prevent a company governed by its law from retaining that status if the com-
pany intends to move its seat to the territory of another Member State,
‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the law of incorpor-
ation’.58 This result does not follow logically from the Daily Mail reasoning.
With the company established as a legal person it is hard to see why freedom
of establishment should not apply. The company was formed in accordance
with the law of a Member State and would still have its registered ofﬁce,
central administration or principle place of business within the EU. As a result
of the Court’s reasoning, Member States are unconstrained by the right to
freedom of establishment, not just in respect of the connecting factor for in-
corporation and formation, but also in respect of decisions taken by lawfully
established companies to the extent that the company intends to remain sub-
ject to the law of incorporation.
Now the Court distinguishes this situation (of a company moving its seat to
another Member State whilst retaining its status as company under the law of
the Member State of origin) from the situation where a company moves to
another Member State in order to convert into a company form provided under
the law of that Member State.59 In that case, the Member State’s power to
55 Joined cases C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.
56 cf Case C-384/93 Alpine Investment BV v Minister van Financie¨n [1995] ECR I-1141,
para 37. 57 Gebhard (n 54) para 37.
58 Cartesio (n 5) para 110. 59 ibid para 111.
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determine the connecting factor for incorporation and for retaining the status
of incorporation ‘cannot . . . justify the Member State of incorporation, by
requiring the winding-up or liquidation of the company, in preventing that
company from converting itself into a company governed by the law of the
other Member State, to the extent that it is permitted under that law to do so.’60
Provisions of the law of the Member State of incorporation that may prevent a
company from converting into a company governed by the law of the host
Member State amount to a restriction to freedom of establishment which,
unless justiﬁed by overriding requirements in the public interest, will be pro-
hibited under article 49 TFEU (ex-article 43 EC).61 This result seems to be in
accordance with, and even to go beyond, the rules the Commission contem-
plated for a Fourteenth Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer
of a company’s registered ofﬁce. In its online consultation, the Commission
suggested that each Member State should recognize the right of a company
governed by its national law to transfer its registered ofﬁce to another Member
State in order to acquire a new legal personality. The host Member State
should not be allowed to refuse to register a company which satisﬁes the
essential substantive and formal requirements for the registration of national
companies. It may however provide as a substantive requirement that the
company’s registered ofﬁce and operational head ofﬁce coincide.62 It is also in
line with the rules governing the transfer of the entity seat to another Member
State laid down by Regulation 2157/2001 on the European Company,63 and
Regulation 1435/2003 on the European Cooperative Society.64 Under these
rules an entity can transfer its registered ofﬁce and its real seat—which both
must be situated in the same country65—to another Member State.66 Such a
transfer entails a change in the applicable law.67 In fact, the Commission
argued that the rules that govern the transfer of the seat of these supra-national
entities could and should be applied ‘mutatis mutandis’ to the cross-border
transfer of the real seat of companies created under domestic law. How-
ever, since Cartesio intended to remain a Hungarian company, these
60 ibid para 112. 61 ibid para 113.
62 For this consultation process and the Commission’s suggestions cf http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/seat-transfer/2004-consult_en.htm (last visited 6 April 2009).
63 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 10 August 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE)
[2001] OJ L 294/1, supplemented by Directive 2001/86/EC of 10 August 2001 on employee
participation [2001] OJ L 294/22.
64 Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the statute for a European co-operative
society (SCE) [2003] OJ L 207/1, supplemented by Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 on
employee participation [2003] OJ L 207/25.
65 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001, art 7; Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003, art 6.
66 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001, art 8; Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003, art 7.
67 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001, art 9(1)(c)(ii)(iii); Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003, art
8(1)(c)(ii)(iii). Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic
Interest Grouping (EEIG) [1985] OJ L 199/1 follows somewhat different rules. Although the
ofﬁcial address must be at the place where the grouping has its central administration or where
one of the members has its central administration (art 12), the ofﬁcial address may be transferred
within the Community with or without change in the applicable law (Art. 13, 14).
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provisions—which result in a change in the applicable law—could not be
applied mutatis mutandis in order to support the applicant’s case.68
Lastly, the Court clariﬁed the ambit of SEVIC. The situation in SEVIC,
according to the Court, was not concerned with the question of continuing
existence of a company under the law of the Member State of incorporation,
but whether or not the company is faced with a restriction in the exercise of its
right of establishment in another Member State. The situation in SEVIC was
therefore similar to the situations in Centros, U¨berseering and Inspire Art69
and could not be of assistance in a case like Cartesio.
For these reasons, the Court held that articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43,
48 EC) ‘are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State
under which a company incorporated under the law of that Member State may
not transfer its seat to another Member State whilst retaining its status as a
company governed by the law of the Member State of incorporation.’70 This
ruling considerably increases complexity of the right to freedom of estab-
lishment. Whether a company and its owners and management may rely on
freedom of establishment appears to be intrinsically linked to, and dependent
upon, the structure not just of the conﬂict of laws rules adopted by the affected
Member States, but also their substantive company laws.
IV. APPLICABLE COMPANY LAW MOVES IN MYSTERIOUS WAYS
We will now analyse several cases in which a company seeks to transfer
its real or registered seat from the Member State of incorporation (Member
State A) to another Member State (Member State B). These cases, which will
be based on different combinations of conﬂict of laws and substantive com-
pany law rules, will show that the criteria developed by the Court of Justice
to delineate the scope of application of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43,
48 EC) lead to arbitrary results and lack an intrinsic justiﬁcation.
Case 1: Assume ﬁrst that Member State A follows the incorporation theory
and that the company wishes to transfer its real seat to Member State B. This is
the case that was decided in Cartesio.71 If the company law of Member State
A stipulates that the centre of administration of the company must be located
in A (again as in Cartesio), the real seat cannot be transferred to B without
dissolution and liquidation of the company.72 If the company law of Member
State A is more liberal, thus not requiring real seat and registered ofﬁce to be
situated within its territory,73 A’s law does not require dissolution and
Cartesio does not have a bearing on the case. Now the conﬂict of laws rules of
the receiving State are of relevance. Under the incorporation theory, the courts
68 Cartesio (n 5) para 115–120. 69 ibid 121–123. 70 ibid para 124.
71 AG Maduro comes to the conclusion that Hungarian company law follows the real seat
theory (n 32) para 23. However, this conclusion does not seem to be in accordance with the
respective Hungarian provisions. See further (n 97).
72 cf the holding in Cartesio (n 5) para 110. 73 cf (n 28).
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in Member State B will apply A’s law, consequently treating the company as a
validly incorporated (foreign) legal entity. The real seat theory would lead to a
different result. The courts in Member State B would apply their own (sub-
stantive) company law. Since the company was not formed under B’s laws, it
would need to dissolve and re-incorporate. However, this consequence has
been enjoined in U¨berseering: A company that has been validly formed under
the laws of one Member State and that transfers its real seat to another
Member State has to be recognized by that second State. Again, the company
is permitted to retain its character as a company under A’s laws.
Case 2: The legal situation is different if the company seeks to transfer its
registered seat from a Member State applying the incorporation theory (A) to
another State (B). As discussed above, the Court of Justice is of the opinion
that this case falls within the reach of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43,
48 EC). The Member State of incorporation may not require the winding-up or
liquidation of the company. Instead, the company must be able to convert into
a form of company governed by the law of the other State.74 A receiving
Member State that follows the incorporation theory will judge the case ac-
cording to its own company law. It may require re-incorporation of the com-
pany before it can take up business as a valid legal entity in that State. Such
prohibitive rules are not in contradiction to the right of establishment. First,
Cartesio makes clear that the continued existence of the company is only
guaranteed, ie articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) only safeguard
the right of a company to convert itself into a company governed by another
legal system, to the extent that the law of the receiving State allows the con-
version.75 Second, the dictum of U¨berseering is restricted to the case of a
company ‘which is validly incorporated in one Member State (‘A’) in which it
has its registered ofﬁce [and which] is deemed, under the law of a second
Member State (‘B’), to have moved its actual centre of administration to
Member State B’.76 In other words, the laws of Member State B are not
reviewed in light of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) unless the
legal existence of the company in Member State A is established.77
If B is a real seat State the analysis is as follows. We assume that the real
seat of the company has remained in A and the company has applied for
registration in B to take advantage of B’s company law, which might be more
liberal or more suitable for the particular purposes of the company.78
Jurisdiction of the registration court or ofﬁce is determined in accordance with
74 Cartesio (n 5) para 112. 75 ibid para 112.
76 U¨berseering (n 2) para 52. 77 ibid para 63.
78 This assumption might not be of great practical relevance. Market actors that wish to take
advantage of the regulatory regime in B will presumably incorporate in B in the ﬁrst place and
conduct all business operations in A, which is the Centros scenario (but cf Oberlandesgericht
[Higher Regional Court] Zweibru¨cken, Wertpapiermitteilungen (WM) 2005, 2140: transfer of the
registered seat of an association formed under French law from France to Germany). However, for
expository purposes all alternatives of a transfer of seat shall be analysed in light of the case law of
the ECJ.
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the procedural law of the State where the court or ofﬁce is located. Since
procedural jurisdiction is a question of public law and, consequently, terri-
toriality, the private international law rules of the Member State and the law
applicable to the company are, at this point of the analysis, irrelevant.79 Thus,
the national law of the receiving Member State determines where registration
after transfer and conversion into a type of company governed by that State’s
law is permitted. In general, the registration court or ofﬁce in whose district
the (new) registered seat of the company will be located has jurisdiction.80
However, the question of whether transfer of seat and conversion without
dissolution and re-incorporation is permissible is one of substantive law; ac-
cordingly, private international law rules determine the applicable law. The
real seat State refers to the law of the incorporation State (A), which will
accept the remission regarding the dissolution of the corporation and probably
refer back to B for the question of re-incorporation.81
Now, Cartesio stipulates that A cannot restrict the movement of the com-
pany from A to B if the transfer entails a change in the applicable law (which
is, in this example, the case). The company does not need to be wound up, and
the company may (depending on B’s company law concerning transfers of
seat from abroad) be registered in B. Or so it would seem. Consider, as men-
tioned above, that according to Cartesio A is not allowed to require winding-
up and liquidation if the company ‘is permitted under [the] law’82 of B to
convert. B’s law, on the other hand, applies A’s company law, which would
require dissolution if that was not prohibited under Cartesio. As can be seen,
the principles established by the ECJ lead to a circular argument. The con-
undrum may be solved by assuming that Cartesio refers only to the substan-
tive law of the receiving State or that B’s remission already implements the
principles of Cartesio, ie does not apply A’s law to the extent that it requires
dissolution.
To summarise, in both cases (transfer of the registered seat from an incor-
poration theory country to another incorporation theory country or to a real
seat country) Member State A is enjoined from requiring dissolution, but the
company may need to re-incorporate under the substantive company law of
Member State B.83 In the second case (transfer into a real seat country) this
79 cf PMankowski andOLKno¨fel, ‘Registrierung’ [Registration] in HHirte and TBu¨cker (eds),
Grenzu¨berschreitende Gesellschaften [Cross-border Corporations] (2nd edn, Carl Heymanns,
Ko¨ln, 2006) · 13, para 2.
80 For example Umwandlungsgesetz [Reorganisation of Companies Act], · 198(2).
81 cf H-F Mu¨ller, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’ [Private International Company Law] in
G Spindler and E Stilz (eds), Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] (CH Beck, Mu¨nchen, 2007)
para 12. 82 Cartesio (n 5) para 112.
83 Unless it is argued that the rationale of Centros and Inspire Art requires the receiving
Member State to allow conversion without re-incorporation. In this direction S. Grundmann,
Europa¨isches Gesellschaftsrecht [European Company Law] (CF Mu¨ller, Heidelberg 2004)
para 779; A Wis´niewski and A Opalski, ‘Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ
Cartesio Judgment’ (2009) 10 EBOR 595, 615, 618.
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consequence is, arguably, rather opaque and the reference in Cartesio to the
law of the receiving Member State circular.
Case 3: The case that raises the most interesting questions is the transfer of
the real seat from a real seat country (A) to another country (B) that follows
either the real seat theory or the incorporation theory. It is questionable what
impact articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) have on the company law
of Member State A. The Court of Justice in Cartesio did not expressly address
this question. However, the holding, when pointing out (in rather obscure
English) that ‘the situation where the seat of a company incorporated under the
law of one Member State is transferred to another Member State with no
change as regards the law which governs that company [shall] be distinguished
from the situation where a company governed by the law of one Member State
moves to another Member State with an attendant change as regards the
national law applicable’,84 seems to imply that our case 3 should be solved in
the same way as case 2. In both cases, the applicable legal regime changes—in
the ﬁrst scenario through a transfer of the registered seat out of an incorporation
theory State, thus altering the factor that determines the applicable law, in the
second scenario through a transfer of the real seat out of a real seat State, again
altering the determinative factor. Arguably, both cases should be governed by
the same principles, ie in both cases theMember State of incorporation may not
require the winding-up or liquidation of the company if the receiving Member
State allows the change of the applicable law without re-incorporation.
Before we proceed with our argument, some terminological difﬁculties
need to be addressed. In Cartesio, the Court of Justice states that ‘in the
absence of a uniform Community law deﬁnition of the companies which may
enjoy the right of establishment on the basis of a single connecting factor
determining the national law applicable to a company’,85 the Member States
are free to determine when and under which conditions a company comes into
existence. Thus, ‘a Member State has the power to deﬁne both the connecting
factor required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the
law of that Member State [. . .] and that required if the company is to be able
subsequently to maintain that status.’86 The Court concludes that a Member
State may prohibit a company to transfer its seat without dissolution to another
Member State, ‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the
national law of the Member State of incorporation.’87 On the other hand,
the Court points out that a transfer ‘with an attendant change as regards
the national law applicable’88 falls within the scope of articles 49, 54 TFEU
(ex-articles 43, 48 EC). Accordingly, measures of the Member State of
incorporation that restrict this right need to be justiﬁed on grounds of an
overriding requirement.89
84 Cartesio (n 5) para 111. 85 ibid para 109 (emphasis added).
86 ibid para 110 (emphasis added). 87 ibid para 110 (emphasis added).
88 ibid para 111. 89 ibid para 113.
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If the Court intended the words ‘connecting factor’90 to mean the factor that
determines the applicable company law (ie the connecting factor in private
international law), as paragraph 109 of the judgment implies, and if it intended
to use the words with the same meaning throughout the whole decision,
it would manage to contradict itself within the span of three paragraphs
(paras 109–111). On the one hand, a transfer of seat which breaks the con-
necting factor and thus changes the applicable law must be permissible with-
out dissolution,91 on the other hand, the consequences of breaking the
connecting factor fall within the power of the Member State.92 The only sen-
sible interpretation is to attach two different meanings to the term ‘connecting
factor’. As the Court stresses in paragraph 109, before a company can avail
itself of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC), it has to be established
whether the company has been formed in accordance with the law of aMember
State.93 This question, and the antecedent question of whose law shall govern
the formation of the company, can necessarily not be predetermined by EC
law.94 Once the company has been validly formed, it may either transfer the
real seat or the registered seat in a way that causes a change in the applicable
law. Any national restriction in this context will be subject to freedom of
establishment. Alternatively, the company may reorganize in a way that does
not relate to a connecting factor for the purpose of private international law. In
that case freedom of establishment does not apply. It follows from this dis-
tinction that the ‘connecting factor’ mentioned in paragraph 110 of the judg-
ment95 must be one that does not determine the applicable law, whereas
paragraph 111 of the judgment refers to the ‘connecting factor’ in the private
international law sense. Consequently, the scenario referred to in paragraph
110 of the judgment cannot be one of a company transferring its real seat out
of a real seat theory State (our case 3). Rather, it must be one of a company
transferring its real seat out of an incorporation theory State (our case 1).
The Advocate General has added to the obscurity by holding that Hungary
followed the real seat doctrine.96 This view is not in conformity with the
interpretation of the Law on Private International Law in Hungary and com-
mon principles of conﬂict of laws. The provisions of the Company Act and the
Law on the Commercial Register that refer to the real seat restrict the scope of
application of Hungarian company law in cases that have a certain connecting
factor (the location of the real seat) with another country; they do not deter-
mine the applicable law.97 Thus, this must be the distinction that the Court of
90 In German: Anknu¨pfung; French: rattachement; Dutch: aanknoping. In the translations, the
ECJ again uses the same term in paras 109 and 110.
91 Cartesio (n 5) para 111. 92 ibid para 110. 93 ibid para 109.
94 Unless, as discussed above, arts 49, 54 TFEU (ex-arts 43, 48 EC) are invoked in respect to
the incorporators. 95 Cartesio (n 5) para 110.
96 AG Maduro, opinion in Cartesio (n 32) 23.
97 Art 18 of Decree-Law No 13 of 1979 on Private International Law Rules (a nemzetko¨zi
maga´njogro´l szo´lo´ 1979. e´vi 13. to¨rve´nyereju˝ rendelet) provides that ‘(1) The legal capacity
of a legal person, its commercial status, the rights derived from its personality and the legal
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Justice has in mind when it differentiates between the two situations in para-
graphs 110 and 111 of the judgment in Cartesio. In conformity with this
interpretation, the Court in Cartesio does not discuss the real seat or incor-
poration theory doctrines and, in fact, never refers to Hungary as a real seat
State.98
relationships between its members shall be determined in accordance with its personal law.
(2) The personal law of a legal person shall be the law of the State in the territory of which it is
registered.’ Cf Cartesio (n 5) para 20. Para (2) of the article clearly states that the registered seat
shall be the connecting factor. Thus, Hungarian private international company law is based on the
incorporation theory. This connecting factor is then, for certain cases, qualiﬁed by virtue of the
interplay of art 1(1) of Law No CXLIV of 1997 on Commercial Companies (a gazdasa´gi
ta´rsasa´gokro´l szo´lo´ 1997. e´vi CXLIV. to¨rve´ny), which stipulates that the Company Act shall
govern only such companies ‘which have their seat in Hungary’ ibid para 11, and art 16(1) of Law
No CXLV of 1997 on the Commercial Register, Company Advertising and Legal Procedures in
Commercial Registration Matters (a ce´gnyilva´ntarta´sro´l, a ce´gnyilva´nossa´gro´l e´s a bı´ro´sa´gi
ce´gelja´ra´sro´l szo´lo´ 1997. e´vi CXLV. to¨rve´ny), which deﬁnes the seat of the company as ‘the place
where [the company’s] central administration is situated’ ibid para 17. The latter two provisions
are not conﬂict of law rules. They circumscribe the scope of application of the Hungarian
Companies Act by requiring a Hungarian company to have its real seat in Hungary. It can in some
cases be difﬁcult to distinguish between a provision of a purely substantive nature that contains an
international element, ie that applies if a certain element is satisﬁed abroad or within the territory
of the lex causae, and provisions that contain a hidden conﬂict of laws rule, ie that determine their
international scope of application notwithstanding the lex causae. The second type of rule has
been described as a ‘self-contained’ (J Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (6th edn, Mohr
Siebeck, Tu¨bingen, 2006) · 13 IV 2) or ‘self-satisﬁed’ provision of substantive law (G Kegel,
‘Die sebstgerechte Sachnorm’ in E Jayme et al (eds), Geda¨chtnisschrift fu¨r Albert A Ehrenzweig
(CF Mu¨ller, Karlsruhe, 1976). The Hungarian provisions are not ‘self-contained’, they do not
decide about the application of Hungarian substantive company law notwithstanding the lex
causae. Conversely, they decide about the exclusion of that law in certain situations (when the
company’s real seat is not located within Hungary), which presupposes its applicability pursuant
to different rules (art 18 of Decree-Law No 13 of 1979 on Private International Law Rules) in the
ﬁrst place.
98 In the literature this correlation between the Court’s deﬁnition of the material scope of arts
49, 54 TFEU (ex-arts 43, 48 EC) and the relevance of the term ‘connecting factor’ for purposes of
real seat and incorporation theory often seems to be overlooked. For example, AF de Sousa,
‘Company’s Cross-border Transfer of Seat in the EU after Cartesio’, Jean Monnet Working Paper
07/09, available at www.JeanMonnetProgram.org, 33, claims that ‘Hungarian law apparently
followed a strict version of the real seat theory.’ However, had that been the case the applicable
law would have changed and pursuant to paragraphs 111–113 of the judgment the Hungarian
restrictions would have been within the scope of freedom of establishment. Moreover, on the basis
of the bifurcation of the term ‘connecting factor’ suggested here the alleged ‘squaring of the
circle’ (at 47) by the Court presents itself as a consistent distinction between the situations in
paragraphs 110 and 111 of the judgment (as long as the reaction of the receiving State is not taken
into account, see case 2 and case 4). In a similar vein, M Szydło, ‘Case C-210/06, CARTESIO
Oktato´ e´s Szolga´ltato´ bt, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 16 December
2008, not yet reported’ (2009) 46 CMLRev 703, explains, on the one hand, that the Court in
Cartesio afﬁrmed that a company’s right to reincorporate in another Member State was within the
scope of arts 49, 54 TFEU (ex-arts 43, 48 EC) (at 717), but alleges, on the other hand, that
pursuant to Cartesio companies are not protected if they lose their status as a company incor-
porated under the law of a particular Member State because they are dissolved or a change of the
applicable law takes place (at 713). A Johnston and P Syrpis, ‘Regulatory competition in
European Company Law after Cartesio’ (2009) 34 ELRev 390, argue that ‘any attempt by a
company incorporated in a real seat Member State to move its real seat out of the jurisdiction is
likely to result in the company being wound up’, despite such a move resulting in an ‘attendant
change’ in the applicable law (Cartesio, n 5 para 111).
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Coming back to our hypothetical, seeking a consistent interpretation of the
holding of the Court of Justice and placing emphasis on the words ‘an at-
tendant change as regards the national law applicable’99 as the deﬁning factor
in deciding whether a scenario falls within the scope of articles 49, 54 TFEU
(ex-articles 43, 48 EC) or not, will lead to the conclusion that the transfer of a
company’s real seat out of a real seat theory State should be treated anal-
ogously to the transfer of the registered seat out of an incorporation theory
State (our case 2). Consequently, national legislation on the incorporation and
winding-up of companies does not enjoy immunity from the provisions on
freedom of establishment.100 We must therefore look at the reaction of
Member State B. If B follows the real seat theory, it will apply its internal
company law. The domestic law will require registration of the company in B
in order for the company to be able to convert to a company form governed by
B’s law.101 B’s company law may or may not require re-incorporation as a
99 Cartesio (n 5) para 111. 100 ibid para 112.
101 The Court in Cartesio uses the term ‘conversion’ somewhat ambiguously, see eg para-
graphs 111–113 of the judgment. ‘Conversion’ may be understood narrowly as the change of a
company into its functional equivalent in another legal system, for example of an English limited
into a German Gesellschaft mit beschra¨nkter Haftung (GmbH), or broadly as any change of form
of business association, for example of an English limited into a German partnership (Gesellschaft
bu¨rgerlichen Rechts pursuant to German Civil Code [BGB], ·· 705–740). The laws of some
Member States understand conversion in the latter, broader sense, see eg Umwandlungsgesetz
[Reorganisation of Companies Act], · 191(2). Such an interpretation of the Court’s decision in
Cartesio could result in unintended liability. Assume, for example, that the directors of a limited
company registered in A relocate from A to B and that both A and B apply the real seat theory.
The relocation may be interpreted as the transfer of the real seat from A to B (confer the facts of
U¨berseering, n 2). An unqualiﬁed application of Cartesio would lead to the following result: The
transfer of the real seat causes a change in the applicable law. Hence, possible impediments to the
transfer imposed by A are prohibited by the Treaty, provided that B allows the company to
relocate and change into a form of company under its own laws. This is the case and does not
require any registration or other explicit legal act by the directors of the company if the partner-
ship law of B provides that a partnership comes into existence whenever two or more persons act
together to promote the achievement of a common purpose (eg German Civil Code [BGB], · 705).
Depending on the partnership law, the involuntary change of the limited company into a part-
nership may entail joint (or joint and several) unlimited liability of all members (eg in the UK
pursuant to Partnership Act 1890, s 9, and in Germany pursuant to Commercial Code [HGB],
· 128, see the decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in BGHZ 142, 315; 146, 341). Thus, rather
than protect the interests of the company’s directors and members and facilitate free movement,
Cartesio would mandate the application of unfavourable partnership law. There are two ways to
avoid this result. First, note that the case described here constitutes a conﬂict between the holdings
in Cartesio and U¨berseering. According to Cartesio, since conversion of the company into
a partnership under the laws of B is permitted, A is not entitled to require liquidation ((n 5)
para 111). However, a company in liquidation satisﬁes the requirements of U¨berseering (n 2) para
52: It is a company that has been ‘validly incorporated in one Member State (‘A’) in which it has
its registered ofﬁce’, and it has, in this scenario, ‘moved its actual centre of administration to
Member State B’. The rules governing a company in liquidation may be more advantageous for
the members of the company than partnership law. Consequently, U¨berseering demands that
Member State B recognises the company as a company in liquidation governed by the laws
of A and that it does not apply its own partnership law. The ﬁrst solution to the quandary is,
therefore, to accord precedence to U¨berseering and disapply Cartesio. Second, the unintended
consequences can be avoided by interpreting the term ‘conversion’ more restrictively and require
an intentional decision of the company for conversion in order for the effects of Cartesio to apply
Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment After Cartesio 319
precondition for registration. If it does require re-incorporation, such a rule
would be absolved from compliance with EU freedom of establishment prin-
ciples pursuant to the concepts established in Cartesio and U¨berseering.102
If B applies the incorporation theory, it will refer to A’s law (since the
registered seat of the company has remained in A). A renvoi (triggered by the
transfer of the real seat to B) will lead to the outcome described in the pre-
ceding paragraph. Finally, let us assume that B’s private international law
refers to the internal (substantive) rules of A to the exclusion of its choice of
law rules, or that Member State A is the forum and A’s private international
law accepts B’s renvoi.103 A’s substantive company law will most likely re-
quire liquidation if the connecting factor (the real seat) is transferred out of its
territory. However, Cartesio prohibits such a restriction in the light of freedom
of establishment (save a possible justiﬁcation) if (1) the transfer leads to a
change in the applicable national law and (2) the transfer of the company
without dissolution is permitted under the law of the receiving Member State.
The law of the receiving State (B) comprises its substantive and private in-
ternational law. Thus, it demands the application of A’s substantive company
law, which, in turn, requires dissolution. Again, we arrive at circular and
nonsensical results on the basis of the concept of free movement of companies
as developed by the European Court of Justice.
Case 4: A company transfers its registered seat out of a real seat theory
State. This case has also not been decided in Cartesio. However, it is anal-
ogous to the scenario of a transfer of the real seat out of an incorporation
theory State (our case 1), which are the facts of Cartesio. Thus, as our cases 2
and 3 demand parallel treatment, so do cases 1 and 4. It follows that the
Member State of incorporation (A) can require winding-up and liquidation
because the location of the registered seat in the territory of A is one of the
‘connecting factors’ that, according to the Court of Justice, the Member State
has the power to deﬁne and that companies have to adhere to if they wish to
avail themselves of freedom of establishment.104 B, on the other hand, will
register the company without re-incorporation if it allows for conversion into a
(see A Wis´niewski and A Opalski, ‘Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio
Judgment’ (2009) 10 EBOR 595, 615–616). This is preferable since it allows the parties to choose
what is more appropriate in the individual case. At the same time, there is no reason to permit
conversion (and hence the consequences of Cartesio) only if the host Member States provides for
a functional equivalent of the home Member State company form (as A Wis´niewski and
A Opalski advocate, ibid 616–617), as long as conversion into a non-equivalent form is consonant
with the wishes of the parties concerned (see also D Zimmer and C Naendrup, ‘Das Cartesio-
Urteil des EuGH: Ru¨ck- oder Fortschritt fu¨r das internationale Gesellschaftsrecht?’ (2009) Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 545, 548).
102 cf case 2.
103 For example Einfu¨hrungsgesetz zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB) [Introductory
Law to the Civil Code] art 4(1).
104 Cartesio (n 5) para 110. Most real seat states will demand dissolution if the registered seat
is transferred to another country even though the applicable law does not change: cf B Großfeld,
‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’ [Private International Company Law] in J Kropholler et al
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domestic company and if the company has not been dissolved pursuant to A’s
law, which is, according to B’s private international law, the applicable law on
this matter (notwithstanding whether B is an incorporation theory or a real seat
theory State). If A does not require dissolution, it could be argued that ac-
cording to the rationale of Centros and Inspire Art B likewise is not permitted
to require re-incorporation or re-location of the real seat to B.105
Case 5: The transfer of both the real seat and the registered seat out of a
Member State that applies the incorporation theory constitutes a combination
of our cases 1 and 2. Since the connecting factor between the company and the
Member State of incorporation that enables the company to rely on the right of
establishment (ie not—at least not only—the connecting factor within the
meaning of private international law) is eliminated it might be assumed that
the Member State of incorporation was entitled to require the company to
dissolve.
Case 6: The transfer of both the real seat and the registered seat out of a
Member State that applies the real seat theory (combination of cases 3 and 4)
is treated similarly. Again, the existence of the company as a creature of the
Member State of incorporation (and, therefore, the precondition for an appli-
cation of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC)) hinges on the preser-
vation of the connecting factor with the Member State of incorporation. The
connecting factor (for example the real seat in the territory of the Member
State of incorporation) is discontinued; therefore, the holding in Cartesio can
be interpreted as empowering the Member State to require dissolution.
However, the treatment of cases 5 and 6 as not falling within the scope of
articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) is not compelling. The connect-
ing factor in case 1 (Cartesio) is the real seat, while the change of applicable
law is brought about by a transfer of the registered ofﬁce (case 2; also decided
in Cartesio as being protected by the right of establishment). Nonetheless, the
connecting factor that has to be satisﬁed for a company to be entitled to
incorporate under the law of a given Member State (be it an incorporation
theory or a real seat theory State) is as much the location of the real seat106 as
the registered seat. The company law of no country will allow incorporation as
a type of company governed by that country’s law without registration in the
country, and hence registered seat located in the territory of the country. Why,
then, should the elimination of the ﬁrst connecting factor (transfer of the real
seat as in case 1) allow the Member State of incorporation to impose restric-
tive measures, but not the elimination of the second connecting factor (transfer
of the registered seat, as in case 2)? If both registered seat and real seat are
(eds), J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch (13th edn, de Gruyter, Berlin,
1993) para 599–604.
105 cf (n 83).
106 Provided that the substantive company law of the Member State of incorporation is struc-
tured as Hungary’s law in Cartesio.
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transferred, as in cases 5 and 6, the applicable law changes, which, according
to Cartesio, triggers the application of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43,
48 EC). This is one of the many inconsistencies of the decision of the Court of
Justice.
V. CONCLUSION
This case-by-case analysis makes clear that the outcome of a free movement
case under the right of establishment of companies as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice depends in an arbitrary manner on the type of
private international company law doctrine (real seat or incorporation theory)
in force in the Member State of incorporation and the receiving Member State.
Why, for example, should a company that transfers the registered seat out of
an incorporation theory State (case 2) be entitled to invoke the protection of
articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) whereas the Member State of
incorporation may require the company to dissolve without having to fear
a violation of the right of establishment if it follows the real seat theory
(case 4)? The same argument can be made with respect to the differential
treatment of our cases 1 (dissolution) and 3 (no dissolution). A justiﬁcation for
this discrimination is absent. It can probably be explained in light of the
trajectories initiated by Daily Mail on the one hand and Centros on the other
hand, and by the reluctance of the Court of Justice to comprehensively reform
the principles established in these two cases. Ever since Daily Mail, the Court
has adhered to the dichotomy of moving-in and moving-out scenarios and the
differences in the scope of application of articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43,
48 EC) implied by the direction of movement. In Cartesio, and earlier in
Lasteyrie du Sallaint and Marks & Spencer, the Court of Justice has retreated
somewhat from a strict dichotomy. In Cartesio, the relaxation appears in the
form of the right of a company to leave the Member State of incorporation if
the transfer of seat triggers a change in the applicable company law. However,
the ECJ has not yet been willing to let go of Daily Mail completely.
A rationalized rule governing the right of establishment should not be gui-
ded by obsolete differentiations but by the question whether free movement of
companies should be facilitated. This is not a dogmatic but an empirical
question. The capacity of incorporators to choose freely between a large
number of company law regimes and types of company and to change the
connecting factor without dissolution after the company has come into exist-
ence enables them to opt for the form and regulatory environment that best
suits their needs. Consequently, it reduces transaction costs for the ﬁrm. On
the other hand, the presence in the territory of a Member State of various types
of company, many of them foreign and some governed by legal regimes that
the domestic adjudicator is not familiar with, increases the costs of infor-
mation and of legal advice for customers and other market participants and the
risk of an incorrect judgment in case litigation cannot be avoided. Thus,
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unrestricted free movement has a negative impact on transaction costs for
third parties. A comprehensive empirical assessment of these impacts should
determine whether—and to which extent—free movement of companies is
desirable. Depending on the outcome of such an assessment, Member States
should be allowed to restrict the transfer of companies into or out of
their territory or be obliged to justify their restrictive measures in light of
articles 49, 54 TFEU (ex-articles 43, 48 EC), notwithstanding whether they
follow the real seat theory or the incorporation theory, whether the company
has transferred the centre of administration or the registered seat, or whether a
moving-in or a moving-out scenario is at issue. It is appreciated that an em-
pirical analysis as envisaged here is complex, difﬁcult to implement, and may
not generate conclusive results.107 Even so, a clariﬁcation of the convoluted
legal principles is imperative in order to restore legal certainty.
107 cf the ambiguous results that empirical surveys in the US have produced, for example
L Bebchuk et al, ‘Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?’ (2002) 90 Cal
Rev 1775, with references.
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